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BOOK REVIEW
REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA, by Roberta S. Karmel,
Simon & Schuster, New York 1982, 400 pp.
When Roberta Karmel was appointed to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1977, the press emphasized that
this New York lawyer was the first woman on the SEC. Karmel's
gender, as it turns out, was probably the least interesting part of her
tenure at the regulatory agency. A member from 1977 to 1980,
Karmel was in almost constant conflict with her fellow
commissioners and was often a lone dissenter. She derived delight
from a quotation that she framed and placed on her Washington
office wall. It stated, "I'm just not ready to assume that merely
because a government official suggests something, it's
automatically in the public interest." What makes the quotation
unusual is that its author was Roberta Karmel herself.
After Karmel returned to New York to be a law partner with
the firm Rogers and Wells, she wrote Regulation by Prosecution, which
was influenced by her experience as both a government regulator
and a Wall Street lawyer. Assailing enforcement practices at the
SEC, Karmel perpetuates her role as an adamant dame of dissent
by belaboring her argument that too much regulation constitutes a
serious drawback to corporate capital accumulation, a deduction
clearly reflected in the book's subtitle, "The Securities and
Exchange Commission vs. Corporate America." The main theme
of the book is that the SEC should stick to the basics - protecting
investors from corporate deception and Wall Street chicanery -
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and should forget about wrenching confessions out of corporations
on overseas bribes, perquisites, and failures to comply with other
agencies' rules. These activities, according to Karmel, may be
ethically repugnant, but they are simply of passing concern to the
public investors. Thus, beset with philosophical incompatibilities
while a commissioner, Karmel continues to wield the harpoon at
Stanley Sporkin, the former SEC chief enforcement officer, whose
emphasis on regulatory conformity brought some merit to him and
the Commission.
Karmel, the daughter of Jewish immigrants who were
Socialists until they lent their allegiance to Franklin D. Roosevelt,
describes herself as a "child of the New Deal" who didn't even
know a Republican until she went away to Radcliff, she has
continued to be an ardent Democrat. During an earlier stint as a
staff attorney in the SEC's New York regional office, she accepted
the Commission's party line that "we are the good guys and those
we are chasing were the bad guys." Only later did she come to
realize that the SEC often won cases that were poorly prepared or
based on questionable legal arguments.
The Commission allowed its staff to vent a self-righteous
reaction to the evils of Watergate. Karmel found that with this
attitude staff members sometimes acquired an arrogance
intolerable in a democratic government. As long as the country
enjoyed a succession of prosperous years, society "could afford the
luxury of government regulation that is legalistic, adversarial, and
concerned with equity instead of efficiency." But in a troubled
economic climate such as the present one, "it is becoming
increasingly apparent that Government regulation . . . is not
working well, because it has been ignoring, and even destroying,
economic values. "
When Karmel began working with the SEC enforcement office
in New York, she realized that the government did not appear as
she had idealized it. Her daily contact with that system transformed
it "from a neoclassic temple where godlike creatures dispensed
justice to a dingy government building where faceless bureaucrats
coped as well as they could with a faceless horde of miscreants. "
She was further disillusioned by the Watergate incident. Although
some liberals may have been eager to expose the scandal ridden
Nixon administration, Karmel was horrified to learn that the
federal government would try to undermine democratic values.
The SEC itself became severely sullied when the public learned that
Nixon's aides had pressured Bradford Cook, the agency chairman,
[VOL. 59:263
BOOK REVIEW
into quashing certain aspects of the investigation of Robert Vesco,
the itinerant financier and Nixon's political contributor. This
whole sordid experience prompted Karmel to conclude that "the
burden was on government to justify its objectives and procedures
when taking action."
During her twenty-eight months as commissioner, she found
that SEC lawyers apparently entertained the opposite reaction.
Many SEC staffers preferred to maintain a self-righteous
determination to show the public that "the business world was as
corrupt as government." Frequently, these official regulators
trampled on the rights of the accused.
Karmel believes that some of her controversial views,
especially on the stultifying effect of government overregulation,
will eventually gain acceptance. The ideas that first shook the
SEC's foundation in 1977 are now orthodox in Washington. Her
views are particularly relevant today because other "questioning
liberal[s]" will similarly experience her apostasy from a New Deal
Democrat to "a wholly corporatized regulator," the label
uncharitably given to her by Ralph Nader.
While recognizing that the SEC, a small and independent
agency, cannot be at the center of the government or the economy,
Karmel regrets that "the federal agency most concerned with
public securities markets has neither a clear statutory directive nor
a tradition that encourages the agency to promote investment."
Although she does not dispute that exorbitant bribes from domestic
corporations to corrupt foreign officials are properly a matter of
national concern, Karmel contends that the SEC's "puritanical
witch-hunts," culminating in some 400 confessions of corporate
bribery and questionable payments, were merely a reaction to the
Watergate incident. She doubts the agency's role of self-appointed
guardian of corporate morals and whether business practices are
rightly the "concern of an independent agency responsible for
financial disclosure to investors." Most investors, after all, care
primarily about capital appreciation and dividends.
In this respect, Karmel sounds the same cadence as Milton
Friedman, an advocate of the free market and the 1976 Nobel
laureate in economics. Both Karmel and Friedman believe that the
duty of corporate executives is to make money for their
stockholders rather than to consider the social consequences of their
actions. Such social awareness in a democratic society would be
fundamentally subversive of free enterprise. It would involve the
adoption of the Socialist view that exhortations and policies of
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political leaders, rather than market forces, are better able to
determine the allocation and uses of society's scarce resources.
Thus, according to Karmel, the Commission should "stop
worrying about how to improve corporate morality and social
responsibility and start worrying about how to encourage the public
to put dollars into savings and investment instead of
consumption."
Fundamentally, the SEC succeeded in controlling corporate
boardrooms because its enforcement division gradually took over
and established Commission policy. Such "regulation by
prosecution" ironically coincided with a massive defection in the
ranks of individual investors during the 1970s. Karmel also indicts
the SEC's allies in Congress. For example, she suspects that the
congressional mandate for a national securities market in 1975 was
motivated more by political inducements than by economic criteria
of efficiency or equity. Coincidentally, the consumer movement
was then reaching its zenith; "the possibility that such a trading
system could impair the viability of the stock exchanges ... was not
only countenanced but welcomed."
Although this rather thick volume constitutes a valuable and
highly interesting addition to a reference shelf, Karmel nonetheless
fails to convince her audience that the mission of the SEC is to
promote the nation's economic growth and capital accumulation.
The suggestion that Congress should give the SEC a new
responsibility, that of boosting productivity and capital formation,
is also perplexing. Karmel, the "questioning liberal," apparently
wants to return to her days as a child of the New Deal, seeking
governmental solutions to economic problems that a regulatory
agency may be poorly equipped to address. If the SEC took on this
new charge, it could not devote adequate attention to investor
protection because of the limited resources at hand. This new task
could decrease confidence in the market place and could greatly
hamper the capital markets themselves. While lowering the barriers
of regulation to assist the formation of capital can be a laudable
design, many dangers lurk in the commingling of regulatory
responsibility and corporate schemes. Also, the Commission's top
priority under any set of conditions should not be the sales
promotion of corporate securities.
Equally disturbing is Karmel's suggestion that the
Commission be relieved of its status as an independent agency and
placed under the wing of the White House. This change, according
to Karmel, would allow the Commission's policies to be
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"integrated into an overall plan for the national economy." Yet,
securities regulation should not be subservient to presidential
policies.
Karmel is unduly cautious in her description of the decision
making process at the SEC. For example, Karmel does not explain
how Stanley Sporkin, SEC chief enforcement officer, prevailed in
many controversial enforcement cases and rulemaking
proceedings. Karmel also depicts the SEC staff as blindly self-
righteous, but then praises the Commission in a perfunctory way
for its intelligence and dedication.
Regulation by Prosecution will be of keen interest to students of
federal regulation. Though it lacks in firsthand reminiscences, it
excels in examining critical issues. To call this a lawyer's book is
not to say that others, such as economists, accountants, historians,
and the securities industry in general, will not find it immensely
compelling and stimulating. The lawyerly style of writing and
exposition, however, will probably intimidate many general
readers. One can quibble also with the use of undefined
terminology and some redundancies. Indeed, the book turns out
less readable than it could have been because of an apparently light
editorial touch. This is unfortunate because the book focuses on a
question critical to our time - how should government interact
with business enterprises? Both critics and defenders of the
SEC will find it difficult to ignore this book. One may already hear
the cheers reverberating through the corridors of Wall Street.
DOMINIQUE N. KHACTU *
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